About Myself Essay Example for Free

About Myself Essay In 1914, World War I began and was commonly referred to around the world as â€Å"The War To End All Wars† and â€Å"The Great War†. As volunteers for the war ran out, the government had to go into a draft. As names were getting pulled, the soon to be soldiers were being pulled out as just a number, not even a name. Following the conclusion of World War I was the emergence of The Great Depression. â€Å"Millions of people were out of work, and there was an alarming concern for the elderly and retired Americans who had lost everything. In 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the original Social Security Act into law. At that time, the US was just beginning to recover from the Great Depression and the program was intended to be -and essentially still is today a social insurance program. It is a government-run program providing economic security to our citizens† (â€Å"Social†). In E.B. Whites â€Å"About Myself†, it can be seen how White viewed numbers as dehumanizing. Today, our numbers seem as secretive as our fingerprints. We buy shredders to obliterate any papers with the very numbers White puts out for all to see: My social security number is 067-01-9841. I am married to US Woman Number 067-01-9807.† In About Myself E.B. White satirizes the American government in order to persuade American citizens to stop describing people using numbers because it is dehumanizing. E.B. White uses emphasis to satirize the American government in order to persuade American citizens to stop describing people with numbers. For example, White talks about how he and his father were both of â€Å"medium height†. This strategy appeals to American citizens because it makes them think about how the one time it would have been appropriate to use numbers as a descriptive term, he decides to use an adjective. By using an adjective versus using a number is shows how he would then become indistinguishable amongst most Americans. See more: Homelessness as a social problem Essay One of the first things Americans use to describe someone is based on their height, whether they are short or tall, so by not using a number and referring to his height as medium height, it makes him indistinguishable to be spotted and picked out amongst most Americans. After reading this essay, American  citizen will begin to use characteristics instead of using numbers to describe people. E.B. White uses a sarcastic tone to mock the American government in order to persuade American citizens to stop describing people with numbers. For example, â€Å"Neither parent had a social security number and neither was socially secure.† The strategy of sarcasm appeals to American citizens because it makes the American citizens think about how they do not need number to feel socially secure. By showing how Americans citizens do not need social security to be secure, it shows how when people socially interact with each other, they do not need or use to numbers to be able to socially talk with society so it would not seem necessary to use numbers in order to be able to describe someone. After reading this, American citizens will begin to use characteristics instead of numbers so they are not dehumanizing. E.B. White uses the hyperbole of numbers to satirize the American government in order to persuade American citizens to stop describing people with numbers. For example, for almost everything he uses to describe himself or others he uses a number to emphasize how people are describing with the use of numbers versus the use of their characteristics. The strategy of hyperbole will appeal to American citizens because it will make them think about how they describe people, whether its based on numbers or characteristics. By thinking about how they are describing people, it will make them think about how it is dehumanizing to describe people as if they were just a number or object and not a human being. After reading this essay, American citizens will stop using numbers to describe people and will begin to use characteristics. In About Myself E.B. White satirizes the American government in order to persuade American citizens to stop describing people using numbers because it is dehumanizing. Throughout his entire essay, White constantly describes everything about himself with a number whether it was a person or an object. As a result, after American citizens read this essay, they will stop referring to and using numbers as a way to describe a person, and in turn they will use characteristics because that it less dehumanizing. Works Cited Social Security: Why It Was Created How It Works. Lawyers.com. 1 Jan. 2014. Web. 16 Dec. 2014. .

A review of capital structure theories

A review of capital structure theories 1.0 Introduction One of the most contentious financial issues that have provoked intense academic research during the last decades is the theory of capital structure. Capital structure can be defined as a Mix of different securities issued by a firm (Brealey and Myers, 2003). Simply speaking, capital structure mainly contains two elements, debt and equity. In 1958, through combining tax and debt factors in a simple model to price the value of a company, Modigliani and Miller firstly begin to explore a modern capital structure theory, and their work inspired this area study. However, the MM theory has no practical use because it lacks of direct guidance for companies to determine capital structure in real life (Baxter, 1967; Sarig and Warga, 1989; Vernimmen et al, 2005). During the past years, researchers strived to establish a more reasonable capital structure theory that can be put into practices efficiently, and they attempted to expand debt ratio and tax advantage factors into a new area. Myers (1984) states that only practical capital structure theories, which introducing adjustment cost that includes agency cost and information asymmetry problems, could provide a useful guidance for firms to determine their capital structure. However, from recent studies, Myers (2001) believes that how information differences and agency costs influence the capital structure is still an open question. From this perspective, it is very important to review the development of these two factors which make theoretical research having a strong relationship with reality. Thus, this project will summarize the capital structure theories orientated by agency cost and asymmetric information from extant literature. Also some gaps and conflicts among theories of capital structure will be found and discussed in order to further improve this area study. The rest of this project is arranged as follows. Section 2 will present the theories based on agency costs that causes the conflicts between equity holders and debt holders or managers. Section 3 will illustrate from two areas, interplay of capital structure and investment, followed by signal effect of debt ratio, to show the theories based on asymmetric information. In conclusion, Section 4 will summarize the entire essay and suggest further research direction of capital structure theory. 2.0 Capital structure theories based on agency costs Although Berry and Means (1931, cited in Myers, 2001) state an adverse relationship between the separated ownership and corporate control status, it commonly admits that Jensen and Meckling (1976) firstly conducted the research in how agency costs determine capital structure (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Over the past decades, researchers have tried to add agency costs to capital structure models (Harris and Raviv, 1991). The perfect alignment between firm investors and firm agencies, such as managers, does not exist (Myers, 2001). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), company agents, the managers, always emphasize on their own interests, such as high salary and reputation. Also these company agents use entrenching investments, which make the asset and capital structure orientated by the managements knowledge and skills, to increase their bargaining power with the true company holders (Chen and Kensinger, 1992). However, Myers (2001) believes that the firm holders can reduce such transferred value through using different kinds of methods of control and supervising, but he further points out the weakness that these methods are expensive and reduce returns. As a result, the perfect monitoring system is out of work, and agency costs are produced from these conflicts. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the conflicts between investors and agencies are generally divided into two types. The first conflict occurs between debt holders and equity holders, and the second conflict is from between equity holders and managers. Consequently, all the capital structure theories based on agency costs can be also classified based on these two conflicts. In the rest of this section, each individual conflict will be separately discussed. 2.1 Conflicts between Debt holders and Equity holders Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that agency costs problems happen in determining the structure of a firms capital when the conflict between debt holders and equity holders is caused by debt contracts. Similar to Jensen and Mecklings conclusion, Myers (1977) observes that since equity holders bear the whole cost of the investment and debt holders get the main part of the profits from the investment, equity holders may have no interest in investing in value-increasing businesses when companies are likely to face bankruptcy in the short term future. Thus, if debt occupies a large part of firms capital, it will lead to the rejection of investing in more value-increased business projects. However, in 1991, Harris and Raviv cast a contrasting opinion to adjust the capital structure theory based on this conflict. They point out that most debt contracts give equity holders a push power to invest sub-optimally investment project. If the investment fails, due to limited liability, debt holders bear the consequences of a decline of the debt value, but equity holders get most of yields if the investment could generate returns above the debt par value. In order to prevent debt holders from receiving unfair treatment, equity holders normally get less for the debt than original expectation from debt holders. Thus, the agency costs are created by equity holders who issue the debt rather than debt holders reason (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Tradeoff capital structure theory has a basic and strong relationship with this type of agency costs. However, different researchers hold various explanations of the relationship. Myers (1977) points out the debt cost reason, Green (1984) announces that convertible bonds can reduce the asset substitution problem which comes from the tradeoff theory, Stulz and Johnson (1985) consider about collateral effect. In the end, only Diamond model (1989) is widely accepted. If Equity holders do not consider reputational reason, they are willing to trade relatively safe projects, but this activity will lead to less debt financing (Diamond, 1989; Mike et al, 1997). Diamond model (1989) assumes two tradeoffs, risky and risk-free, to show that the debt repayment should consider both possible investment plans. Furthermore, Mike et al (1997) use empirical evidence to indicate how to use debt to trade off these two optional investment plans. Moreover, in 1991, Harris and Raviv expanded Diamonds model to three investment choices. They point out that one choice of investment can only contain the risk-free project, one option can invest in risk project and the last option combine both risk-free and risk projects. In fact, since the reputation factor is vital for a manager, managers are willing to choose risk-free investment projects that have more possibility of success. Consequently, the amount of debt is often reduced by managers. 2.2 Conflicts between Managers and Equity holders Jensen and Meckling (1976) also states that conflicts naturally arise between managers and equity holders since managers just hold parts of the whole firms capital. Consequently, firm mangers only benefit from part of the profit generated by their business activities, but they simultaneously bear the whole cost of these actions. However, Myer (2001) casts a different opinion about the reason of the conflict and claims that in fact, managers never bear the full costs of the business activities unless the manager is also the firms investor. He further maintains that the real cause of the conflict is due to an imperfect observable reward system between investors and managers, because both parties have different standpoints to measure their own interest, especially the rewards. There are two dominant models, the Harris and Raviv model and the Stulz model, to explain this area. Although both models have a common assumption that labor contracts cannot address the conflict between managers and equity holders, both models hold different opinions about debt release and the problem in the drawbacks of debt in the capital structure. According to Harris and Raviv model (1990), managers are designed to want to continue the companys current operations all the time even if equity holders prefer the liquidation of the company. However, in Stulz model (1990), managers are keen to invest all available funds even if the equity holders can benefit from paying out cash. Moreover, Harris and Raviv (1990) point out that debt alleviates the agency costs and the conflict results from giving equity holders the chance to speed up liquidation when cash flows are hard to predict. In contrast, Stulz (1990) based on Jenson model (1986) concludes that debt payments reduce free cash flow. He further maintains that the debt costs reduce the available funds of a profitable project, since the costs result from debt payment that more than exhausts free cash flow. As a result, capital structure can be determined by trading off debt advantages against debt costs. 3.0 Capital structure theories based on asymmetric information The development of information modeling provides a possible approach to explain capital structure. In these capital structure theories, company insiders, such as managers, are assumed to obtain all private information about the investment opportunities or investment return. Some theories try to find out how the allocation of capital structure passes the insiders information of a firm to outsiders. Meanwhile, in other theories, the purpose of the capital structure is to improve efficiencies in the companys investment activities under asymmetric information (Vernimmen et al, 2005). The rest of this section will be divided into two subsections based on both sets of theories mentioned above. 3.1 Interplay of capital structure and investment This area of research begins with two vital academic papers, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). According to Myers and Majluf (1984), the firms equity will be mispriced by the market when investors obtain less information of one firms assets value than the firms current insiders. Moreover, they further point out that if firms issue equity to absorb capital for a new investment, mispricing may make a net loss to the firms current shareholders. In Myers second paper (1984), he formally defines this as a pecking order capital structure theory. In this theory, a firms capital structure is determined by the purpose of the company to finance new investment. Furthermore, with the development of the Myers pecking order theory, researchers find some vital empirical implications of this theory. Krasker (1986) confirms the results of Myers theory (1984) and also shows that the larger the equity issue, the worse the asymmetric information problem and the firm with worse asymmetric information problems will often have a more under price problem. Ebsen (1986) finds that if managers could trade their firms new equity, the under price problem caused by asymmetric information will be reduced. Then Dierkens (1991) argues that the under price problem can be solved by information releases such as annual financial statement reports. However, some economists cast a doubt on the pecking order theory. These theoretical researches have a common feature that they all put investment situations under the pecking order theory but provide more finance choices for a firm. Brennan and Kraus (1987) state that it is not necessary for a firm to have a preference for financing through debt over equity and the under price problem can be addressed through various financing options and simple capital structure rather than solving asymmetry information problem. Their findings are also confirmed by Noe (1988). Moreover, in 1993, Nachman and Noe put Brennan and Kraus theory into practice and also come to the same conclusion. 3.2 Signal effect of debt ratio After discussing models which investigate the interplay of capital structure and investment, it is vital to turn to models in which investment is a fixed factor and only capital structure is regarded as a private information signal. The investigation of this area starts with the work of Ross (1977). According to Rosss capital structure theory, only firms insiders, such as managers, can get full information of the firms return distribution, but investors cannot. The main empirical implication of Ross theory is that there is a positive relation between firm value and debt ratio. However, further research combines debt and dividend policy together to show an opposite opinion that a firm value is determined by dividend and debt ratio rather than a single factor of debt ratio (Vernimem et al, 2005). Furthermore, in 1982, Heinkel improve Ross model. His model is similar to Ross but does not have the same assumption. Instead, high market value firms are assumed to have high total value but low quality debt, thus high market value firms has high equity value. This finding has been consistent with further capital structure theoretical research (Franke, 1987; John, 1987). Another debt ratio signal model is built by Poitevin (1989). He firstly points out the potential competition between an entrant and an incumbent under the asymmetric information. According to Poitevin model (1989), the marginal costs of entrant are private information obtained only by the entrant, and in a stable situation, the capital of high cost entrants does not issue any debt while low cost entrants never issue equity. However, Glazer and Israel (1990) cast a different conclusion against Poitevin. They maintain that low cost entrants are willing to issue equity since they can much easier use this finance approach to reduce marginal production costs than the high cost entrants. Nevertheless, Harris and Raviv (1991) point out the weakness of the Glazer and Israel model is that they ignore the dividends finance factor which has the same signal effect as debt. Normally, a capital structure theory should combine various basic finance factors together. In the end, Glazer and Israel recognize this weakness and claim that their results cannot be considered as a capital structure theory. 4.0 Summary and Conclusion To sum up, this literature review of capital structure theories is element arranged. The set of theories based on agency costs and the set of theories based on asymmetric information are separately presented in the passage. Moreover, each set of theories can also be divided into several subsections. Agency costs cause two types of conflicts among stakeholders, and these conflicts affect a firms choice of capital structure. Moreover, capital structure theories show that under an asymmetric information situation, capital structure has a strong reaction with investment activities and debt ratio has a signaling utility for the determination of capital structure. The range of the selected paper is from 1958 to 2005. These papers cover majority parts of the study including agency costs, interplay of capital structure and investment, imperfect information situations and debt signal effect. Also these papers are all from core financial journals, e.g. Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial Management, American Economic Review and Review of Financial Studies. Thus, this literature review can be considered to be efficient and thorough. This essay covers a considerable number of literatures which can present modern theoretical findings of capital structure. However, it should be noticed that the blooming period of capital structure theory is between 1970s-1980s. After 1990, the theoretical research seems to have developed very slowly, and the majority of papers in this field just review former findings since few new theories of capital structure come out. The direction of the theoretical research of capital structure should incline to be more practical. The future study should be extended in two areas. (1) Add psychosocial conditions and assumptions to improve extant capital structure theories. It is important to acknowledge that most capital structure theories cannot be used by companies in real life since these theories lacks of more reality factors. Thus, behavior finance could provide a new approach to extant theories. (2)Combine agency costs and asymmetric information problems together in one capital structure theory. Currently, both problems are discussed separately. However, companies often suffer from these two problems at the same time when they determine their capital structure. Consequently, it is necessary to set up a new theory based on both problems. Bibliography 1. Baxter, N. (1967) Leverage, risk of ruin, and the cost of capital, Journal of Finance, 22, pp. 395-403. 2. Brealey, R. A. and Myers, S. C. (2003) Principles of Corporate Finance. 7th edn. New York: The McGraw-Hill Company. 3. Brennan, M. and Alan, K. (1987) Efficient financing under asymmetric information, Journal of Finance, 42, pp 1225-1243. 4. Chen, A. H. and Kensinger, J. (1992) Uncommon Equity, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5(1), pp. 36-43. 5. Diamond, D. W. (1989) Reputation acquisition in debt markets, Journal of Political Economy, 97, pp. 828-862. 6. Dierkens, N. (1991) Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26(2), pp.181-199. 7. Ebsen, E. (1986) The Valuation Effects of Corporate Debt Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics. 15(1), pp. 119-152. 8. Franke, G. (1987) Costless signaling in financial markets, Journal of Finance, 42, pp.809-822. 9. Glazer, and Israel, R. (1990) Managerial incentives and financial signaling in product market competition, International Journal of Industrial Economics, 8, pp. 271-280. 10. Green, R.C. (1984) Investment incentives, debt, and warrants, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, pp. 115-136. 11. Harris, M. and Raviv, A. (1990) Capital structure and the informational role of debt, Journal of Finance, 45, pp.321-349. 12. Harris, M. and Raviv, A. (1991) The Theory of Capital Structure, The Journal of Finance, 46(1), pp. 297-355. 13. Heinkel, R. (1982) A theory of capital structure relevance under imperfect information, Journal of Finance, 37, pp.1141-1150. 14. Jensen, M. C. and William, H. M. (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Management, 3(4), pp. 305- 360. 15. Jenson, M. C. (1986) Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, American Economic Review, 76(2), pp. 323-29. 16. John, K. (1987) Risk-shifting incentives and signaling through corporate capital structure, Journal of Finance, 42, pp. 623-641. 17. Krasker, W. (1986) Stock price movements in response to stock issues under asymmetric information, Journal of Finance, 41, pp. 93-105. 18. Leland, H.E. (1994) Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure, Journal of Finance, 49(4), pp. 1213-1252. 19. Mike, B., Gromb, D. and Panunzi, F. (1997) Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, pp. 693-728. 20. Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958) The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment, American Economic Review, 48, pp.261-297. 21. Myers, S. C. (1977) Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics, (5), pp. 147-175. 22. Myers, S.C. (1984) The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance, 39, pp.575-592. 23. Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, pp.187-221. 24. Myers, S. C. (2001) Capital Structure, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), PP. 18-102. 25. Nachman, David C. and Noe, T. H. (1993) Design of securities under asymmetric information, Working paper, Georgia Institute of Technology. 26. Noe, T. (1988) Capital structure and signaling game equilibria, Review of Financial Studies, 1, pp. 331-356. 27. Poitevin, M. (1989) Financial signaling and the deep-pocket argument, Rand Journal of Economics, 20, pp.26-40. 28. Ross, S. (1977) The determination of financial structure: The incentive signaling approach, Bell Journal of Economics, 8, pp.23-40. 29. Sarig, O., and Warga A. (1989) Some empirical estimates of the risk structure of interest rates, Journal of Finance, 44, pp. 1351-1360. 30. Stulz, R. and Johnson, H. (1985) An analysis of secured debt, Journal of Financial Economics, 14, pp. 501-521. 31. Stulz, R. (1990) Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies, Journal of Financial Economics, 26, pp.3-27. 32. Vernimmen, P., Quiry, P., Dallocchio, M., Fur, Y. L., Salvi, A. (2005) Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice, 6th edn. West Sussex: John Wiley Sons. Ltd.

Trip to Japan Essay -- essays research papers

It was May 25, 2001. What was clear however, was the fact that I was soon going to be on my own in a country where I did not know the language or the people that I would be meeting there and staying with. The adrenaline rushed through me as I packed the last of my things and ran out of the door. I closed the door to my house and jumped in the car. The idea of leaving America and going to Japan seemed to really not have hit me yet, but now that I look back I know that I had to feel it. I think that the things that I was feeling was such a blob of mixed emotions that I really did not know how to feel so I will just say that I was excited. At the airport I met my best friend and two other friends of mine from school. We would all be traveling together, most all the time. The only things th...

Bartleby of Bartleby the Scrivener :: Bartleby Scrivener Essays

Bartleby of Bartleby the Scrivener   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚      Herman Melville’s short story â€Å"Bartleby the Scrivener† introduces many interesting characters with many different personalities to us. However, out of Ginger Nut, Turkey, Nippers, and the Old Man who narrates the story, the one that is most mysterious to us is Bartleby. Bartleby is a scrivener, which, in simple terms, is a human version of a modern day copy machine. He does his job extremely well, hardly ever stopping his work and getting things done quickly and efficiently. However, he is a man of few words. In fact, he is a man of one phrase: â€Å"I would prefer not to.† He says this in response to anything that is requested of him other than to copy documents. He actually outright refuses to do anything else that his boss (the narrator) asks him to do. This is the first step in confusing the reader about Bartleby. Melville, however, never seems to offer an answer to this mystery. Another interesting thing that I noticed was that Bartleby never said †Å"I will not.†, but â€Å"I prefer not.† This would indicate that the person he is talking to has an option as to choosing what Bartleby will or won’t do, but it is said in such a way that it manages to confuse the narrators feelings, and causes him, for a long period of time, to simply accept the statement as a â€Å"no†. This appears to me as a weakness of the narrator as a business owner, but at the same time makes me wonder what is Bartleby’s purpose for responding in such a way. Another interesting characteristic of Bartleby is his living habits, which we find out about later in the story. He apparently lives at the office (originally unbeknownst to the narrator). He sleeps, washes, and works in the same place. What makes this even more interesting is that he refuses (or states that he would â€Å"prefer not†) to change his living arrangements. When the narrator moves his business, and Bartleby refuses to vacate the premises after the ne w tenant arrives, the narrator is taken to be responsible for Bartleby, simply because he is the only person who is even close to knowing him. After a lengthy process that ends with Bartleby in prison, who seemingly regards the narrator as the reason for his being there, the story quickly closes with the demise and death of Bartleby, and the strange introduction of the â€Å"grub man† (who seems as though he has some deeper importance in the story which I cannot place).

Hersheys Food Corporation :: essays research papers

The Hershey Food Corporation is a very successful and quality business. Many products are manufactured by this corporation. Most relating, but not limited to chocolate. The corporation plays a role in deciding where products are produced. Hershey’s has expanded to both Canada and Mexico, which calls for many corporate decisions. There are an amazing amount of products associated with Hershey. These include Jolly Ranchers, Hershey Kisses, Hershey drink mixes, the entire line of Reese’s products as well as good old fashion chocolate bars. These products serve in the candy/snack foods division of sales. Society could do without them... but why would we want to?   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Hershey’s takes advantage of many different types of advertising. Television commercials and ads are very common. Sponsorships is also another very common way Hershey advertises. Hershey sponsors everything from ice skating shows, to racecars. The Hershey Food Corporation is very competitive so they need this type of advertising. However, the only other major corporation to compete with is Mars. The chocolate industry is diffidently not pure competition. Mars and Hershey’s form an oligopoly. Hershey’s has so many different kind of products that they have a lot of competition. The company has branched out to where they’re not only competing against other chocolates but also for fruit candies, and baking chocolate and chocolate drinks as well. The fact that so many products are offered, extends the corporation to different divisions. Mexico and Canada have manufacturing plants. Seventeen manufacturing plants include Hershey, Pa (Hershey p lant, Reese plant, West Hershey plant0, Hazleton, PA, Lancaster, PA, Memphis, Tenn., Naugatuck, Conn., New Brunswick, NJ, Oakedale, CA, Palmyra, PA, Reading, PA, Robinson, Ill., Stuarts Draft, VA, Wheatridge, CO, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Montreal, Quebec, Smiths Falls, Ontario, and Guadalajara, Mexico.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  As successful as Hershey’s is, some factors have influenced set backs for the company. Devaluation in Brazil, Russia’s economic collapse, restructuring in China and the Asian financial crisis. World economics effect the Hershey’s company as well. Another closer to home setback occurred with a pasta divestiture. Evidently they tried a new venture in the pasta industry, but sold it because it just wasn’t making enough money.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Mr. Hershey treated his employees exceptionally well, ever since he first opened his business. His personal philosophy revolved around sharing wealth with others and helping who he could. Even in the Great Depression he employed as many people as he could. His business helped support an entire town, built around his factory.

A Raisin in the Sun vs. Julius Caesar Essay

In William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar and Lorraine Hansberry’s A Raisin in the Sun themes, symbols, and characters can be compared. Both A Raisin in the Sun and Julius Caesar were written for the stage; therefore their characters become more obvious and more thoroughly portrayed than in a book, for example. Even though, these works were written by far different authors and in different centuries their similarities and differences are evident. In both A Raisin in the Sun and Julius Caesar themes, symbols, and character development are consistent. Comparing character development in Julius Caesar and A Raisin in the Sun is beneficial in learning more about each and every character. One of the major characters in A Raisin in the Sun is Mama; a character she can be compared to in Julius Caesar is Calpurnia. Despite Mama has a bigger role in Hansberry’s work and Calpurnia’s role in Shakespeare’s work is not as powerful as Mama, similarities are still evi dent. One way they are similar is in their authority over one person or a few people in general, their families to be more specific. In A Raisin in the Sun, Mama has a strong opinion regarding her beliefs. She stands up for them and stresses respect. Mama is also the head of the Younger household. She reminds everyone who is living with her the difference between right and wrong. However, Mama seems to be a bit more concerned with what Walter is always doing. Walter is her eldest son. In the same way, Calpurnia stresses what she believes in. Similar to how Mama watches out for her son Walter, Calpurnia tries to warn her husband, Julius Caesar, against evil and something awful that has a potential of happening. Mama shows her authority over Walter when she gives him the responsibility of putting away a share of the money, â€Å"Listen to me, son. I say I been wrong, son. That I been doing to you what the rest of the world been doing to you. (She turns of the radio) Walter—(She stops and he looks up slowly at her and she meets his eyes pleadingly) What you ain’t never understood is that I ain’t got nothing, don’t own nothing ain’t never really wanted nothing that wasn’t for you. There ain’t nothing as precious to me†¦There ain’t nothing worth holding on  to, money, dreams, nothing else—if it means—if it means it’s going to destroy my boy. (She takes an envelope out of her handbag and puts it in front of him and he watches her without speaking or moving) I paid the man thirty-five hundred down on the house. That leaves sixty-five hundred dollars. Monday morning I want you to take this money and take three thousand and put it in a savings account for Beneatha’s medical schooling. The rest you put in a checking account—with your name on it. And from now on any penny that come out of it or go in it is for you to look after. For you to decide. (She drops her hands a little helplessly) It ain’t much, but it’s all I got in the wor ld and I’m putting it in your hands. I’m telling you to be the head of this family from now on like you supposed to be† (Hansberry 106-107). In a similar way Calpurnia takes authority over Julius Caesar, â€Å"Alas my lord, your wisdom is consumed in confidence. Do not go forth to-day; call it my fear that keeps you in the house, and not your own. We’ll send Mark Antony to the senate-house; and he shall say you are not well to-day; let me, upon my knee, prevail in this† (Shakespeare 2.2). Both Calpurnia and Mama take authority over someone. Due to the fact that both tasks were not taken seriously both Walter and Caesar run into turmoil later in the literary work. In Walter’s case, he doesn’t do as Mama says and loses his and Beneatha’s money as well as people’s trust in him (Hansberry 127-128). In Caesar’s case, him not staying home and returning to the senate against his wife’s will, Caesar is greeted with his death (Shakespeare 3.1). In both works of literature, symbolism is commonly used. Some of the symbols used in A Raisin in the Sun are Mama’s plant, Beneatha’s hair, and the check Mama receives after her husband dies. In Raisin in the Sun, Mama’s plant represents her dreams and the rest of her family’s dreams. A result of this would be Mama always making sure to take extra care of her plant and to nourish it well. On the other hand, Mama’s check represents all of the hard work that her husband achieved and how hard he had to work to actually obtain that amount of money. Beneatha’s hair symbolizes the assimilationist beliefs of the time and how people become inferior to the dominant race. When Beneatha returns her hair to its natural state it symbolizes that she is against common assimilation beliefs. The symbolism of her hair is evident in a conversation between her and Asagai, â€Å"’(Coming to her at the mirror) I shall have to teach you how to drape it properly. (He flings the material  about her for the moment and stands back to look at her) Ah—Oh-pay-gay-day, oh-gaha-mu-shay. (A Yoruba exclamation for admiration) You wear it well†¦very well†¦mutilated hair and all.’ ‘(Turning suddenly) My hair—what’s wrong with my hair?’ ‘(Shrugging) Were you born with it like that?’ ‘(Reaching up to touch it) No†¦of course not. (She looks back to the mirror, disturbed)’ ‘(Smiling) How then?’ ‘You know perfectly well how†¦as crinkly as yours†¦that’s how’† (Hansberry 61-62). The symbols used in Julius Caesar are omens, pain, and the conspirators bathing in Caesar’s blood. In Julius Caesar, omens symbolize evil and warn people against evil and bad things that could happen, possibly fatal things. By the conspirators bathing or washing their hands in Caesar’s blood they are symbolizing that they are taking responsibility for ridding Rome of its ‘terrible’ leader. Portia, Brutus’s wife, uses the symbol of pain to show how much she loves Brutus, that she is loyal to him, and he can trust her. Portia harshly kills herself by swallowing hot coals because Brutus refuses to share anything with her, â€Å"No man bears sorrow better. That tidings came. With this she fell distract and, her attendants absent, swallo’d fire (Shakespeare 4.3 147, 155-156). By using symbolism Hansberry and Shakespeare made their readers and audience think with depth and understanding. In A Raisin in the Sun, several themes are covered throughout the play; the same goes for Julius Caesar. Even though there are many themes in these works of literature there are two that stand out and can be compared. The themes that are similar between A Raisin in the Sun and Julius Caesar are pride and the role of men and women in society and the house. In A Raisin in the Sun pride is theme because the Younger family doesn’t have much but they have their pride. Throughout the play their pride is tested but they never hesitate to speak their minds. When Mama buys a house in a white neighborhood they are a bit hesitant at first but are happy in the end. They show their pride concerning this situation when a representative from Clybourne Park comes and asks them to sell the house back but in the end they don’t and kick Linder out of their house. Pride is very evident in the conversation between Walter, Linder, and Ruth, â€Å"’(Putting on his glasses and drawing a form out of the briefcase) Our association is prepared, through the collective effort of our people, to buy the house from you at a financial gain to your family.’ ‘Lord have mercy, ain’t this the living gall!’ ‘All right, you through?’ ‘Well, I want to give  you the exact terms of the financial arrangement—’ ‘We don’t want to hear no exact terms of no arrangements. I want to know if you got any more to tell us ‘bout getting together?’ ‘(Taking off his glasses) Well—I don’t suppose that you feel†¦Ã¢â‚¬â„¢ ‘Never mind how I feel—you got any more to say ‘bout how people ought to sit down and talk to each other? †¦ Get out of my house, man. (He turns his back and walks to the door) (Hansberry 118-119). Even though pride is a similar theme between Julius Caesar and A Raisin in the Sun, the pride in Julius Caesar is different than that in A Raisin in the sun. Works Cited Hansberry, Lorraine. A Raisin in the Sun. New York: Vintage, 1994. Print. â€Å"Julius Caesar Theme of Pride.† Shmoop. N.p., n.d. Web. 06 Jan. 2013. â€Å"A Raisin in the Sun Theme of Pride.† Shmoop. N.p., n.d. Web. 06 Jan. 2013. â€Å"Play ScriptJulius Caesar.† Full Text / Script of the Play Julius Caesar Act I by William Shakespeare. N.p., n.d. Web. 06 Jan. 2013.

Research Methodology – Summary

Descriptive studies help discover new meaning, describe what currently exists, and categorize the information. We will use desk research as well as field research; we will use both kinds of research because this way we will have the most appropriate Information. Desk research will include telephone Interviewing, online research etc. On the other hand we have field research, this will give us an edge because we'll be out in the field and have interaction with potential customers, immediate feedback etc. Experiments: We can experiment to see if a certain amount of people will actually enjoy and have good views towards Wipers.Research strategies: * Telephone Interviewing. * Questioning at shops Like Blocker and Supermarkets. * Questionnaires. Personal Interviewing. Purpose of the research: * Finding out the competitors. * Finding out if there is a place for us in market. * Finding out how marketable our product is. * Finding out what potential customers think of our product. Population and Sample: We have concluded that the Ranted regions will be the first regions for our questionnaires to find place at. Because of these regions populations It Is the most appropriate way to have Interaction with many potential customers..Because of the population it is obvious that it is not feasible to give unlimited samples, therefore a feedback to us and so we will process this data as well. As it is obvious that we want to have the most efficient information out of this selected group there will be some exclusion and inclusion criteria requirements. Include: * Stay at home ; working women or men * Age group of 18-50 * Minimum of 50 and maximum of 80 participants Exclude: * Kids Individuals who never clean their houses themselves ( help in the house ) We will have a letter of invitation for it to be send to our potential participants.Within this letter of invitation we will explain the reason of the research, discussion on confidentiality and what the participation will entail. With this letter of invitation will be agreement form, which must be read, signed and returned by participants in order to take part in the research. The time period will be two weeks. Participants will experience using the product and have their feedback on a written document as well as face to face interviews ( this tit only a again selected group ) Our analyzers will have a week time to process the gained data in the research.Data collection methods and procedures: As previously stated we intend to carry out a qualitative research design, In order to do so it requires us to have one on one interviews with the interviewees. This allows the interviewees to discuss their opinions and experiences. Having said that, there are also different kinds of interview styles. There is the semi-structured interview which has a prepared topic guide or certain amount of questions to be covered with each participant.How long the interviews will last depends on the kind of interview which will tak e place and on the participants' responses which will lead the direction and length of the interview. Participants will be ensured of their anonymity as well. Data analysis: The purpose of data analysis is to organize and provide structure to the research data. Qualitative data analysis occurs in three phases: description, analysis and interpretation. We will transcribe the interviews and carry out analyzing of the transcripts.Furthermore we will go on and complete a reduction in data through categorizing ND identifying similar information of the data we have gathered throughout the data and compare variables. Validity and Reliability: Validity is understood best by the question: ‘Are we measuring what we think we are measuring? And reliability is the degree to which a test consistently measures whatever it measures. So to test the validity and reliability we will perform a pilot study which is a brief and limited version of the planned research and which will help us identify any weaknesses in the plan and allow time to rectify any necessary amendments.A pilot study will allow us to make any adjustments before the main event takes place. Ethical consideration: All research studies present a number of ethical and moral concerns which must be identified and addressed prior to carrying out any research study in order to protect all participants from potential harm. Therefore we have asked our participants to sign a consent form ensuring them of the confidentiality and informing them about the nature of the research. However, we don't expect any ethical dilemmas to occur because of the nature of our research.